Iran Appeasers Leverett and Mann Worked for Condi

In the years after 9/11, Iran Appeasers Flynt Leverett and his wife Hillary Mann worked at the highest levels of the Bush administration as Middle East policy experts for the National Security Council. Mann conducted secret negotiations with Iran. The goal was to strike a "Grand Bargain" with the Iranian regime guaranteeing that US will not try to change the form of government in Iran, in return for certain "promises" by Tehran not to support Islamic terrorist organizations.

Below is a part of their report.

The full report can be found at: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9507E0DE1131F931A15751C1A9609C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=1

Alos in Esquire article: http://www.esquire.com/features/iranbriefing1107


Iran will only cooperate with the United States, whether in Iraq or on the nuclear issue, as part of a broader rapprochement addressing its core security concerns. This requires extension of a United States security guarantee -- effectively, an American commitment not to use force to change the borders or form of government of the Islamic Republic -- bolstered by the prospect of lifting United States unilateral sanctions and normalizing bilateral relations. This is something no United States administration has ever offered, and that the Bush administration has explicitly refused to consider.

Indeed, no administration would be able to provide a security guarantee unless United States concerns about Iran's nuclear activities, regional role and support for terrorist organizations were definitively addressed. That is why, at this juncture, resolving any of the significant bilateral differences between the United States and Iran inevitably requires resolving all of them. Implementing the reciprocal commitments entailed in a ''grand bargain'' would almost certainly play out over time and in phases, but all of the commitments would be agreed up front as a package, so that both sides would know what they were getting.

Unfortunately, the window for pursuing a comprehensive settlement with Iran will not be open indefinitely. The Iranian leadership is more radicalized today, with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president, than it was three years ago, and could become more radicalized in the future, depending on who ultimately succeeds Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as supreme leader. If President Bush does not move decisively toward strategic engagement with Tehran during his remaining two years in office, his successor will not have the same opportunities that he will have so blithely squandered.